AT&TTMOBILESPRINT selling customer real-time location...I Gave a Bounty Hunter $300. Then He Located Our Phone
I Gave a
Bounty Hunter $300. Then He Located Our Phone
By Joseph Cox Jan 8 2019, 9:08 am
T-Mobile, Sprint, and AT&T are selling access to their
customers’ location data, and that data is ending up in the hands of bounty
hunters and others not authorized to possess it, letting them track most phones
in the country.
Nervously, I gave a bounty hunter a phone number. He had offered
to geolocate a phone for me, using a shady, overlooked service intended not for
the cops, but for private individuals and businesses. Armed with just the
number and a few hundred dollars, he said he could find the current location of
most phones in the United States.
The bounty hunter sent the
number to his own contact, who would track the phone. The contact responded
with a screenshot of Google Maps, containing a blue circle indicating the
phone’s current location, approximate to a few hundred metres.
Queens, New York. More
specifically, the screenshot showed a location in a particular
neighborhood—just a couple of blocks from where the target was. The hunter had
found the phone (the target gave their consent to Motherboard to be tracked via
their T-Mobile phone.)
The bounty hunter did this
all without deploying a hacking tool or having any previous knowledge of the
phone’s whereabouts. Instead, the tracking tool relies on real-time location
data sold to bounty hunters that ultimately originated from the telcos
themselves, including T-Mobile, AT&T, and Sprint, a Motherboard
investigation has found. These surveillance capabilities are sometimes sold
through word-of-mouth networks.
Whereas it’s common
knowledge that law enforcement agencies can track phones with a warrant to
service providers, IMSI catchers, or until recently via other companies that
sell location data such
as one called Securus, at least one company, called Microbilt,
is selling phone geolocation services with little oversight to a spread of
different private industries, ranging from car salesmen and property managers
to bail bondsmen and bounty hunters, according to sources familiar with the
company’s products and company documents obtained by Motherboard. Compounding
that already highly questionable business practice, this spying capability is
also being resold to others on the black market who are not licensed by the
company to use it, including me, seemingly without Microbilt’s knowledge.
Motherboard’s investigation
shows just how exposed mobile networks and the data they generate are, leaving
them open to surveillance by ordinary citizens, stalkers, and criminals, and
comes as media and policy makers are paying more attention than ever to how
location and other sensitive data is
collected and sold. The investigation also shows that a wide
variety of companies can access cell phone location data, and that the
information trickles down from cell phone providers to a wide array of smaller
players, who don’t necessarily have the correct safeguards in place to protect that
data.
“People are reselling to
the wrong people,” the bail industry source who flagged the company to
Motherboard said. Motherboard granted the source and others in this story
anonymity to talk more candidly about a controversial surveillance capability.
Your mobile phone is
constantly communicating with nearby cell phone towers, so your telecom
provider knows where to route calls and texts. From this, telecom companies
also work out the phone’s approximate location based on its proximity to those
towers.
Although many users may be
unaware of the practice, telecom companies in the United States sell
access to their customers’ location data to other
companies, called location aggregators, who then sell it to specific clients
and industries. Last year, one location aggregator called LocationSmart faced
harsh criticism for selling data that ultimately ended up in the hands of
Securus, a company which
provided phone tracking to low
level enforcement without requiring a warrant. LocationSmart
also exposed the very data it was selling through
a buggy website panel, meaning anyone could geolocate nearly any
phone in the United States at a click of a mouse.
There’s a complex supply
chain that shares some of American cell phone users’ most sensitive data, with
the telcos potentially being unaware of how the data is being used by the
eventual end user, or even whose hands it lands in. Financial companies use
phone location data to detect fraud; roadside assistance
firms use it to locate stuck customers. But AT&T, for example, told
Motherboard the use of its customers’ data by bounty hunters goes explicitly
against the company’s policies, raising questions about how AT&T allowed
the sale for this purpose in the first place.
“The allegation here would
violate our contract and Privacy Policy,” an AT&T spokesperson told
Motherboard in an email.
In the case of the phone we
tracked, six different entities had potential access to the phone’s data.
T-Mobile shares location data with an aggregator called Zumigo, which shares
information with Microbilt. Microbilt shared that data with a customer using
its mobile phone tracking product. The bounty hunter then shared this
information with a bail industry source, who shared it with Motherboard.
The CTIA, a telecom
industry trade group of which AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile are members, has official
guidelines for the use of so-called “location-based
services” that “rely on two fundamental principles: user notice and consent,”
the group wrote in those guidelines. Telecom companies and data aggregators
that Motherboard spoke to said that they require their clients to get consent
from the people they want to track, but it’s clear that this is not always
happening.
A second source who has
tracked the geolocation industry told Motherboard, while talking about the
industry generally, “If there is money to be made they will keep selling the
data.”
“Those third-level
companies sell their services. That is where you see the issues with going to
shady folks [and] for shady reasons,” the source added.
Frederike Kaltheuner, data
exploitation programme lead at campaign group Privacy International, told
Motherboard in a phone call that “it’s part of a bigger problem; the US has a
completely unregulated data ecosystem.”
Microbilt buys access to
location data from an aggregator called Zumigo and then sells it to a dizzying
number of sectors, including landlords to
scope out potential renters; motor
vehicle salesmen, and others who are conducting
credit checks. Armed with just a phone number, Microbilt’s
“Mobile Device Verify” product can return a target’s full name and address,
geolocate a phone in an individual instance, or operate as a continuous
tracking service.
“You can set up monitoring
with control over the weeks, days and even hours that location on a device is
checked as well as the start and end dates of monitoring,” a company
brochure Motherboard found online reads.
Posing as a potential
customer, Motherboard explicitly asked a Microbilt customer support staffer
whether the company offered phone geolocation for bail bondsmen. Shortly after,
another staffer emailed with a price list—locating a phone can cost as little
as $4.95 each if searching for a low number of devices. That price gets even
cheaper as the customer buys the capability to track more phones. Getting
real-time updates on a phone’s location can cost around $12.95.
“Dirt cheap when you think
about the data you can get,” the source familiar with the industry added.
It’s bad enough that access
to highly sensitive phone geolocation data is already being sold to a wide
range of industries and businesses. But there is also an underground market
that Motherboard used to geolocate a phone—one where Microbilt customers resell
their access at a profit, and with minimal oversight.
“Blade Runner, the iconic
sci-fi movie, is set in 2019. And here we are: there's an unregulated black
market where bounty-hunters can buy information about where we are, in real
time, over time, and come after us. You don't need to be a replicant to be
scared of the consequences,” Thomas Rid, professor of strategic studies at
Johns Hopkins University, told Motherboard in an online chat.
The bail industry source
said his middleman used Microbilt to find the phone. This middleman charged
$300, a sizeable markup on the usual Microbilt price. The Google Maps
screenshot provided to Motherboard of the target phone’s location also included
its approximate longitude and latitude coordinates, and a range of how accurate
the phone geolocation is: 0.3 miles, or just under 500 metres. It may not
necessarily be enough to geolocate someone to a specific building in a
populated area, but it can certainly pinpoint a particular borough, city, or
neighborhood.
In other cases of phone
geolocation it is typically done with the consent of the target, perhaps by
sending a text message the user has to deliberately reply to, signalling they
accept their location being tracked. This may be done in the earlier roadside
assistance example or when a company monitors its fleet of trucks. But when
Motherboard tested the geolocation service, the target phone received no
warning it was being tracked.
The bail source who
originally alerted Microbilt to Motherboard said that bounty hunters have used
phone geolocation services for non-work purposes, such as tracking their
girlfriends. Motherboard was unable to identify a specific instance of this
happening, but domestic stalkers have repeatedly used technology, such as
mobile phone malware, to
track spouses.
As Motherboard was
reporting this story, Microbilt removed documents related to its mobile phone
location product from its website.
A Microbilt spokesperson told Motherboard in a statement that the
company requires anyone using its mobile device verification services for fraud
prevention must first obtain consent of the consumer. Microbilt also confirmed
it found an instance of abuse on its platform—our phone ping.
“The request came through a
licensed state agency that writes in approximately $100 million in bonds per
year and passed all up front credentialing under the pretense that location was
being verified to mitigate financial exposure related to a bond loan being
considered for the submitted consumer,” Microbilt said in an emailed statement.
In this case, “licensed state agency” is referring to a private bail bond
company, Motherboard confirmed.
“As a result, MicroBilt was
unaware that its terms of use were being violated by the rogue individual that
submitted the request under false pretenses, does not approve of such use
cases, and has a clear policy that such violations will result in loss of access
to all MicroBilt services and termination of the requesting party’s end-user
agreement,” Microbilt added. “Upon investigating the alleged abuse and learning
of the violation of our contract, we terminated the customer’s access to our
products and they will not be eligible for reinstatement based on this
violation.”
Zumigo confirmed it was the
company that provided the phone location to Microbilt and defended its
practices. In a statement, Zumigo did not seem to take issue with the practice
of providing data that ultimately ended up with licensed bounty hunters, but
wrote, “illegal access to data is an unfortunate occurrence across virtually
every industry that deals in consumer or employee data, and it is impossible to
detect a fraudster, or rogue customer, who requests location data of his or her
own mobile devices when the required consent is provided. However, Zumigo takes
steps to protect privacy by providing a measure of distance (approx. 0.5-1.0
mile) from an actual address.” Zumigo told Motherboard it has cut Microbilt’s
data access.
"People are reselling to the wrong people."
In Motherboard’s case, the
successfully geolocated phone was on T-Mobile.
“We take the privacy and
security of our customers’ information very seriously and will not tolerate any
misuse of our customers’ data,” A T-Mobile spokesperson told Motherboard in an
emailed statement. “While T-Mobile does not have a direct relationship with
Microbilt, our vendor Zumigo was working with them and has confirmed with us
that they have already shut down all transmission of T-Mobile data. T-Mobile
has also blocked access to device location data for any request submitted by
Zumigo on behalf of Microbilt as an additional precaution.”
Microbilt’s product
documentation suggests the phone location service works on all mobile networks,
however the middleman was unable or unwilling to conduct a search for a Verizon
device. Verizon did not respond to a request for comment.
AT&T told Motherboard
it has cut access to Microbilt as the company investigates.
“We only permit the sharing
of location when a customer gives permission for cases like fraud prevention or
emergency roadside assistance, or when required by law,” the AT&T
spokesperson said.
Sprint told Motherboard in
a statement that “protecting our customers’ privacy and security is a top
priority, and we are transparent about that in our Privacy Policy [...] Sprint
does not have a direct relationship with MicroBilt. If we determine that any of
our customers do and have violated the terms of our contract, we will take
appropriate action based on those findings.” Sprint would not clarify the
contours of its relationship with Microbilt.
These statements sound very
familiar. When The New York Times and Senator Ron Wyden
published details of Securus last year, the firm that was offering geolocation
to low level law enforcement without a warrant, the telcos said they were
taking extra measures to make sure their customers’ data would not be abused
again. Verizon announced it was going to limit data access to companies not
using it for legitimate purposes. T-Mobile, Sprint, and AT&T followed suit shortly
after with similar promises.
After Wyden’s pressure, T-Mobile’s CEO John
Legere tweeted in June last year “I’ve personally evaluated
this issue & have pledged that @tmobile will not sell customer location
data to shady middlemen.”
"It appears these promises were little more than worthless
spam in their customers’ inboxes."
Months after the telcos
said they were going to combat this problem, in the face of an arguably even
worse case of abuse and data trading, they are saying much the same thing. Last
year, Motherboard reported
on a company that previously offered phone geolocation to
bounty hunters; here Microbilt is operating even after a wave of outrage from
policy makers. In its statement to Motherboard on Monday, T-Mobile said it has
nearly finished the process of terminating its agreements with location aggregators.
“It would be bad if this
was the first time we learned about it. It’s not. Every major wireless carrier
pledged to end this kind of data sharing after I exposed this practice last
year. Now it appears these promises were little more than worthless spam in
their customers’ inboxes,” Wyden told Motherboard in a statement. Wyden is proposing
legislation to safeguard personal data.
Due to the ongoing government
shutdown, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was unable
to provide a statement.
“Wireless carriers’
continued sale of location data is a nightmare for national security and the
personal safety of anyone with a phone,” Wyden added. “When stalkers, spies, and
predators know when a woman is alone, or when a home is empty, or where a White
House official stops after work, the possibilities for abuse are endless.”
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