Internet Platforms Want Centralized Censorship... That should Scare You
PLATFORMS
WANT CENTRALIZED CENSORSHIP. THAT SHOULD SCARE YOU
IN THE IMMEDIATE aftermath of the horrific attacks
at the Al Noor Mosque and Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand,
internet companies faced intense scrutiny over their efforts to control the
proliferation of the shooter's propaganda. Responding to many questions about
the speed of their reaction and the continued availability of the shooting
video, several companies published posts or gave interviews that revealed new information about their content
moderation efforts and capacity to respond to such a high-profile incident.
WIRED OPINION 04.18.19 09:00
AM
Facebook, for example, describes plans for an expanded role for the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, or GIFCT.
The GIFCT is an industry-led self-regulatory effort launched in 2017 by
Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube. One of its flagship projects is a
shared database of hashes of files identified by the participating companies to
be “extreme and egregious” terrorist content. The hash database allows
participating companies (which include giants like YouTube and one-man
operations like JustPasteIt) to automatically identify when a user is
trying to upload content already in the database.
In Facebook's post-Christchurch
updates, the company discloses that it added 800 new hashes to the database, all related to the
Christchurch video. It also mentions that the GIFCT is "experimenting with
sharing URLs systematically rather than just content hashes"—that is,
creating a centralized (black) list of URLs that would facilitate widespread
blocking of videos, accounts, and potentially entire websites or forums.
Microsoft president Brad Smith
also calls for building on the GIFCT in a recent post, urging industry-wide action. He suggests a
"joint virtual command center" that would enable tech companies to
coordinate during major events and decide what content to block and what
content is in "the public interest." (There has been considerable debate among journalists and media organizations
about how to cover the Christchurch event in the public interest. Smith does
not explain how tech companies would be better able to reach a consensus view,
but unilateral decisions on that point, made from a corporate and US-based
perspective, will likely not satisfy a global user base.)
One major problem with expanding the hash database is that the initiative has long-standing transparency and accountability deficits.
No one outside of the consortium of companies knows what is in the database.
There are no established mechanisms for an independent audit of the content, or
an appeal process for removing content from the database. People whose posts
are removed or accounts disabled on participating sites aren't even notified if
the hash database was involved. So there's no way to know, from the outside,
whether content has been added inappropriately and no way to remedy the
situation if it has.
The risk of overbroad censorship
from automated filtering tools has been clear since the earliest days of the
internet, and the hash database is undoubtedly vulnerable to the same risks. We
know that content moderation aimed at terrorist propaganda can sweep in news
reporting, political protest, documentary footage, and more. The GIFCT does not
require members to automatically remove content that appears in the database,
but in practice, smaller platforms do not have the resources to do nuanced
human analysis of large volumes of content and will tend to streamline
moderation where they can. Indeed, even YouTube was overwhelmed by a one-video-per-second
upload rate. In the days after the shooting, it circumvented its own
human-review processes to take videos down en masse.
The post-Christchurch push for
centralizing censorship goes well beyond the GIFCT hash database. Smith raises
the specter of browser-based filters that would prohibit users from accessing
or downloading forbidden content; if these in-browser filters are mandatory or
turned on by default, this pushes content control a level deeper into the web.
Three ISPs in Australia took the blunt step of blocking websites that hosted the shooting video
until those sites removed the copies. While the ISPs acknowledged that this was an extraordinary
circumstance, this decision was a stark reminder of the power of internet
providers to exercise ultimate control over what users can access and post.
When policymakers and industry
leaders talk about how to manage insidious content that takes advantage of
virality for horrific aims, their focus typically falls on how to ensure that
content removal is swift and comprehensive. But proposals for quick and
widespread takedown, with no safeguards or even discussion of the risks of
overbroad censorship, are incomplete and irresponsible. Self-regulatory
initiatives like the GIFCT function not only to address a particular policy
issue, but also to stave off more sweeping government regulation. We've already
seen governments, including the European Union, look to co-opt the hash database and transform it from a
voluntary initiative into a legislative mandate, without meaningful safeguards
for protected speech. Any self-regulatory effort will face this same problem.
Safeguards against censorship must be an integral part of any proposed
solution.
Beyond that, though, there's a fundamental threat posed by
solutions that rely on centralizing content control: The strength of the
internet for fostering free expression lies in its decentralized nature, which
can support a diversity of platforms. This decentralization allows some sites
to focus on providing an experience that feels safe, or entertaining, or
suitable for kids, while others aim to foster debate, or create an objective
encyclopedia, or maintain an archive of videos documenting war crimes. Each of
these is a distinct and laudable goal, but each requires different content
standards and moderation practices. As we debate where to go after
Christchurch, we must be wary of one-size-fits-all solutions and work to
preserve the diversity of an open internet.
WIRED Opinion publishes pieces written by outside contributors
and represents a wide range of viewpoints. Read more opinions here. You can also submit an op-ed here: opinion@wired.com
Comments
Post a Comment