DHS: Feds Must Assess Possible Continuity of Government Disruption in EMP Attack or GMD
DHS: Feds Must Assess Possible Continuity of Government
Disruption in EMP Attack
By BRIDGET JOHNSON OCTOBER 9, 2018
WASHINGTON -- Proper planning for a potentially
catastrophic EMP attack has been hampered by knowledge gaps about the nature of
such an incident and a lack of authority for the Department of Homeland
Security to call the shots in disparate critical infrastructure sectors,
according to a new report.
The Strategy for Protecting and Preparing the Homeland
against Threats from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and Geomagnetic Disturbance
(GMD) released today by DHS covers intentional electromagnetic pulse attacks,
including high-altitude nuclear detonations, along with naturally occurring
geomagnetic disturbances, or solar coronal mass ejections; both could wreak
havoc on critical infrastructure such as the power grid, water systems,
transportation and communications. "The impacts are likely to cascade,
initially compromising one or more critical infrastructure sectors, spilling
over into additional sectors, and expanding beyond the initial geographic
regions," notes the report.
"Essentially, any electronics system that is not
protected against extreme EMP or GMD events may be subject to either the direct
'shock' of the blast itself or to the damage that is inflicted on the systems
and controls upon which they are dependent," DHS adds.
The strategy doesn't include a plan for implementation,
which DHS said would be forthcoming to guide management, oversight and
appropriations. Development of the implementation plan will also include input
from other federal agencies and the private sector.
EMP and GMD incidents are characterized by DHS as
"low probability/high consequence scenarios that challenge effective
policymaking," and "significant uncertainties exist regarding the
likely effects of extreme EMP and GMD events on existing civilian critical
infrastructure." DHS is looking for hints from past events such as the
1989 solar storm that knocked out power to six million customers in much of
Quebec for several hours or the Carrington Event of 1859, which electrified
telegraph lines and resulted in major outages.
A severe GMD event "could create a complex set of
cascading effects, including requiring rerouting of air traffic to avoid areas
where communication and navigation would be limited by space weather
impacts."
"Many of the most harmful effects caused by
electromagnetic incidents occur within milliseconds or seconds. These effects
may simultaneously damage critical energy distribution nodes and industrial
control systems over wide geographic areas through damage to microprocessors
and power transformers. Such simultaneous disruptions over large areas of the
country would likely undermine the implementation of mutual aid plans and
agreements, a cornerstone of our approach to disaster response," says the
DHS strategy. "Response and recovery may be further complicated by the
relative lack of awareness of electromagnetic threats and hazards in government
and industry, the potential unavailability of communication systems, and the
dearth of operational experience in dealing with the aftermath of
electromagnetic incidents."
Priorities in the strategy, in the event of an attack or
space storm, are minimizing the loss of life and restoring critical
infrastructure.
The department will focus on three risk-mitigation goals:
Improving risk awareness of electromagnetic threats, enhancing capabilities to
protect critical infrastructure should an incident occur, and promoting
effective electromagnetic-incident response and recovery.
"Current EMP-related intelligence gathering, sharing,
and analysis remains largely stove-piped within the federal government and
across DHS, which leads to disparate understanding of potential electromagnetic
threats and hazards," the report says. "This problem also creates
uncertainties about how DHS should address critical infrastructure
vulnerabilities. In addition, government entities are often challenged in their
ability to understand vulnerabilities and consequences to private and public
sector critical infrastructure from EMP threats. These knowledge gaps make
risk-informed decision-making difficult."
"...Limited scientific research exists regarding the
vulnerabilities of the electric grid and other critical infrastructure from the
impacts of electromagnetic threats and hazards. Governmental, academic, and
private sector entities need a more unified research effort to better inform
risk assessments that support preparedness measures for the civilian
sector."
Even with more research, DHS noted that "translating
scientific discovery into updated and more effective protective measures
against electromagnetic threats is difficult due to the distributed ownership
of the nation’s critical infrastructure and its diverse regulatory
regime."
"National means of detecting imminent GMD-hazard
events and notifying critical infrastructure owners and operators exist, but
analogous capabilities to address EMP threats require further
development," the strategy continued. "In addition, potential
disruption to the continuity of government (COG) by an electromagnetic event
has not been fully assessed and remedied. This includes assessing what
redundant capabilities may be needed to ensure the impact of electromagnetic
incident is limited and infrastructure remains resilient."
The fact that potential damage caused by EMP could be
spread across a multitude of sectors also presents challenges as
"commercial interests and the specter of regulatory enforcement create
disincentives for owners and operators to openly share information about
potential disruptions to their systems caused by electromagnetic events."
"DHS critical infrastructure protection efforts are
largely centered on voluntary partnerships and heavily depend on information
sharing," the report notes. "The department actively supports
vulnerability mitigation but does not generally have authority to compel
it."
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